Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection by Braz Camargo & Benjamin Lester
 
WORKING PAPER NO. 11-36 
TRADING DYNAMICS IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS 
WITH ADVERSE SELECTION 
 
Braz Camargo 
São Paulo School of Economics—FGV 
 
Benjamin Lester 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
and University of Western Ontario 
 




 Trading Dynamics in Decentralized Markets
with Adverse Selection
Braz Camargoy
S~ ao Paulo School of Economics{FGV
Benjamin Lesterz
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
and
University of Western Ontario
July 29, 2011
Abstract
We study a dynamic, decentralized lemons market with one{time entry and charac-
terize its set of non{stationary equilibria. This framework oers a theory of how a
market suering from adverse selection recovers over time endogenously; given an ini-
tial fraction of lemons, the model provides sharp predictions about how prices and
the composition of assets evolve over time. Comparing economies in which the initial
fraction of lemons varies, we study the relationship between the severity of the lemons
problem and market liquidity. We use this framework to understand how asymmetric
information contributed to the breakdown in trade of asset{backed securities during the
recent nancial crisis, and to evaluate the ecacy of one policy that was implemented
in attempt to restore liquidity.
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11 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970), it is well known that the introduction of low
quality assets, or \lemons," into a market with asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers
can disrupt trade; the typical result is that sellers with high-quality assets are unwilling to
sell at depressed prices, and thus only low-quality assets are exchanged in equilibrium. Given
this result, the problem of adverse selection is often used to explain why the market for high
quality assets can break down or freeze. However, perhaps surprisingly, much less is known
about how and when the exchange of these assets resumes, or how this market thaws.
In this paper, we develop a simple model of trade under adverse selection and use it
to study how the severity of the lemons problem (i.e., the initial fraction of lemons in
the market) aects the patterns of trade over time. In contrast to much of the existing
literature, in which unfreezing a market requires an exogenous event or intervention, we
incorporate several natural features of actual asset markets that allow this process of recovery
to occur endogenously. Thus, given any initial fraction of lemons, our model delivers sharp
predictions about the length of time it takes for the market to recover, and how prices and
the composition of assets remaining in the market behave over this horizon.
We nd that the patterns of trade depend systematically on the initial fraction of lemons.
In particular, when the lemons problem is mild (i.e., this fraction is small), trades are
executed quickly and at relatively uniform prices. However, when the lemons problem is
more severe, trade can take a substantial amount of time and the terms of trade can vary
signicantly, both across agents and over time. We also characterize how the severity of the
lemons problem aects the expected amount of time it takes to sell a high quality asset,
which we interpret as a measure of the market's illiquidity; a liquid market is one where
sellers can quickly nd a buyer to purchase their high quality asset (at an acceptable price),
whereas an illiquid market is one where this process takes a long time. In this sense, the
theory presented here provides a novel theory of liquidity based on adverse selection.
Given that our framework describes explicitly how markets can recover over time on their
own, it also provides a natural framework to analyze how the introduction of policies aimed
2at restoring liquidity can speed up (or, perhaps, slow down) this process. We provide a
specic example related to the recent nancial crisis and illustrate how our environment can
provide unique insights into the ecacy of such policy interventions.
We take as a starting point the classic lemons market of Akerlof (1970) and make a few
simple modications. First, in order to study how a frozen market can recover over time, the
environment must be dynamic and equilibria must be non{stationary. Therefore, we consider
a discrete{time, innite{horizon model in which a xed set of buyers and sellers have the
opportunity to trade in each period. In addition, we assume that agents permanently exit
the market after trading, and there are no new entrants. As a result, a central aspect of our
analysis is how the composition of assets remaining in the market evolves over time, and how
this interacts with agents' incentives to trade at a particular point in time or delay. Thus, in
our model there is a formal sense in which trade may be sluggish because agents are waiting
for market conditions to improve, which seems to be an important feature of many frozen
markets that cannot be captured in a static or stationary setting.
Second, we focus our analysis on markets in which trade is decentralized; in contrast to
the competitive paradigm, where agents are bound by the law of one price, we assume that
buyers and sellers are matched in pairs, and that they decide bilaterally whether to trade and
at what price. This assumption is consistent with the trading structure in many important
asset markets, such as the markets for asset{backed securities, corporate bonds, derivatives,
real estate, and even certain equities.1
There are two reasons why these modications allow for the eventual exchange of high
quality assets. First, there are two mechanisms that can adjust to facilitate trade: the
price and, equally important, the time at which a transaction takes place. Second, agents
with dierent quality assets are allowed to trade at dierent prices.2 In the context of this
environment, we then ask the following questions. Are all assets|and in particular high
quality assets|eventually bought and sold? If so, how long does it take? How does the
1By now, the literature on decentralized or \over{the{counter" asset markets has grown quite large; see,
e.g., Due et al. (2005), Vayanos and Weill (2008), and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009).
2See Blouin (2003) and Moreno and Wooders (2010) for more extensive comparisons between centralized
and decentralized exchange in a dynamic setting with adverse selection.
3presence of low quality assets aect the expected amount of time it takes to sell high quality
assets? How do prices and the composition of assets in the market evolve over time?
Before we report our ndings, it is helpful to describe the model in more detail. The
economy starts at t = 0 with an equal measure of buyers and sellers. A fraction q0 2 (0;1)
of sellers possess a single high quality asset, and the remainder possess a single low quality
asset. The quality of a seller's asset is private information. In each period t = 0;1;2;:::, all
agents receive a stochastic discount factor shock, and then buyers and sellers in the market
are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs.3 Once matched, buyers make one of two
exogenously set price oers: a high price (that in equilibrium is accepted by all sellers) or
a low price (that in equilibrium is only accepted by impatient sellers with the low quality
asset). If a seller accepts the buyer's oer, trade ensues and the pair exits the market; if the
seller rejects, the agents remain in the market. There are gains from trade in every match;
in particular, the ecient outcome is for all trade to take place immediately.
Within this environment, we completely characterize the equilibrium set for all q0 2 (0;1),
and use this characterization to study the eects of asymmetric information on the patterns
of trade. First, given any q0, we show that all assets are bought and sold|the market
clears|in a nite number of periods. The patterns of trade are such that average price
oers and the average quality of assets in the market increase over time until, eventually, the
average quality is high enough that all remaining buyers oer the high price, and the market
clears. However, the amount of time it takes until the market clears depends crucially on the
initial fraction of high quality assets: the equilibrium characterization involves partitioning
the interval (0;1) based on how many periods of trade, k, it takes before all assets are bought
and sold, for a given q0 2 (0;1). Figure 1 below depicts a typical (very simple) partition.
We highlight two interesting features of this equilibrium characterization. First, there
is a natural monotonicity to the equilibrium set: as q0 gets smaller, it takes longer for the
market to clear. We also derive the expected amount of time it takes to sell a high quality
3The assumption of random discount factors not only captures the idea that some agents need to transact






Figure 1: Number of Periods (k) Before Markets Clear for q0 2 (0;1)
asset, which measures the extent to which the market for these assets is illiquid, and analyze
the relationship between this measure of illiquidity and the initial fraction of lemons. It is in
this sense that our model provides a theory of endogenous liquidity that varies systematically
across states of the world and over time.
Second, note that the equilibrium regions in Figure 1 overlap: for some values of q0,
there are multiple equilibria that take dierent amounts of time for the market to clear. The
driving force behind this multiplicity is a complementarity between buyers' actions. When
other buyers oer the high price, average quality in the ensuing period does not change,
since sellers with both high and low quality assets accept the high price in equal proportion.
This gives buyers less incentive to wait for future periods to trade and more incentive to
oer a high price now. On the other hand, when other buyers are oering the low price, a
larger proportion of sellers with low quality assets accept this oer relative to sellers with
high quality assets, and average quality in the future increases. This provides buyers less
incentive to oer a high price and trade immediately. The existence of multiple equilibria for
a given q0 suggests that coordination failures can also contribute to illiquidity in dynamic,
decentralized market settings with adverse selection.
As pointed out above, since our model provides an explicit theory of how markets recover
on their own, it also provides a natural framework to analyze policies aimed at speeding up
this process. As a leading example, we consider a stylized version of a policy implemented in
the market for asset{backed securities in the wake of the nancial crisis that began in 2007,
the so{called Public{Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets.4 This policy provided
4Our model captures many of the essential features of this market: trade is decentralized, the fall of
housing prices implied substantial heterogeneity in the value of these assets, and in many cases sellers had
more information about these assets than potential buyers. We argue each of these points in greater detail
in Section 6.
5non{recourse loans to buyers willing to purchase these securities, thus reducing the buyers'
downside exposure should they discover that they acquired a lemon.
In the context of many standard models of adverse selection, a reduction of down{side
risk would almost surely ease the lemons problem and help restore liquidity. Within the
context of our model, we show that this policy can have an ambiguous eect on market
recovery. Intuitively, this policy increases the incentive of buyers to oer the high price,
thus increasing both current and future payos for sellers holding low quality assets. If
the increase in future payos is greater than the increase in current payos, this provides
the owners of low quality assets with the incentive to delay trade, thus slowing the market's
recovery. As it turns out, this is more likely when q0 is small. We believe this result highlights
the importance of analyzing policies to restore liquidity within the context of an environment
that models explicitly the interaction between the evolution of market conditions and the
agents' incentives to delay trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing the related literature below,
we introduce the environment in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish some basic properties
of equilibria, and in Section 4, we provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium set.
In Section 5, we discuss three aspects of our equilibrium characterization: the relationship
between liquidity and the lemons problem, the dynamics of trade, and the multiplicity of
equilibria. In Section 6, we discuss our application to the market for asset{backed securities.
In Section 7, we discuss some of our assumptions, including the restriction to exogenous
prices, and also what happens to market eciency when the time interval between trading
opportunities converges to zero. Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature
Our work builds on the literature that studies dynamic, decentralized markets with asymmet-
ric information and interdependent values.5 The majority of this literature restricts attention
5There is a parallel literature that studies dynamic, decentralized markets with asymmetric information
about private values; most closely related to our work is Moreno and Wooders (2002), who focus on the
characterization of non{stationary equilibria.
6to stationary equilibria; see, for example, Inderst (2005), Moreno and Wooders (2010), and
the references therein. A notable exception is Blouin (2003), who analyzes non{stationary
equilibria. In all of these papers, the primary focus is to determine what happens to equilib-
ria in a decentralized trading environment as market frictions vanish.6 In contrast to these
papers, we provide a complete characterization of the set of non{stationary equilibria, and
use this characterization to study the patterns of trade over time and how these are aected
by the severity of the lemons problem.
There is also a large literature that studies the lemons problem in a dynamic setting in
which trade is conducted through competitive markets. Most similar to our paper is Janssen
and Roy (2002), who also focus on non{stationary equilibria and the patterns of trade over
time.7 In their model, the market price at each date is the expected value of the asset to
buyers, due to free entry, so that buyers are somewhat passive and receive zero payos in
equilibrium. In contrast, the buyers in our model are quite active, and the trade{o they face
between current and future payos is a dominant feature of the equilibrium characterization.
Our work is also related to the growing literature studying the eects of intervention in
frozen markets. Perhaps most similar is Chiu and Koeppl (2009), who introduce asymmetric
information into the random{matching framework of Due et al. (2005) and characterize
steady{state equilibria in which the lemons problem is suciently severe to shut down trade.
They, too, analyze the eect of policy intervention on trading dynamics, and show that a
government purchase of low quality assets can help to restore liquidity. We highlight the
crucial dierences between this result and our own in Section 6.8
From a technical point of view, our work is related to the literature on sequential bargain-
ing with asymmetric information and interdependent values. This literature typically studies
the case of a single seller and a single buyer who bargain over time, or a single long{lived
6This was an exercise rst conducted in a perfect information setting by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985)
and Gale (1986a, 1986b).
7Within the context of a stationary environment, there are many papers in this literature that study how
introducing additional institutions, technologies, or contracts can further ease the lemons problem; see, for
example, Hendel et al. (2005) and the references therein.
8Other recent papers studying the eects of asymmetric information on asset market liquidity and policy
interventions include Guerrieri and Shimer (2010), Chari et al. (2010), Tirole (2011), Philippon and Skreta
(2010), and House and Masatlioglu (2010).
7seller who faces a sequence of short{lived buyers.9 As in our framework, a feature of these
models is that buyers use time to screen dierent types of sellers.10 However, these models
typically have a unique equilibrium, whereas we nd multiple equilibria. In Section 5, we
discuss how the multiplicity in our environment is driven by the fact that we have a market
setting with long{lived agents.
Finally, this paper adds to the class of models that provide a theory of endogenous mar-
ket liquidity based on asymmetrically informed counterparties. Rocheteau (2009) provides
an excellent survey of search{based models in which information frictions interfere with ex-
change and thus decrease liquidity. Eisfeldt (2004), on the other hand, develops a formal
relationship between the severity of the lemons problem and liquidity within a competitive
market framework; in her model, an inux of low quality assets drives down the (pooling)
equilibrium price of the high quality asset, thus decreasing a seller's ability to exchange the
latter type of asset for cash. Finally, the dominant theory of liquidity in the nance literature,
pioneered by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985), also uses informational asymme-
tries to generate dierences in liquidity by focusing on the problem of a market{maker and
treating the size of the bid{ask spread as a measure of liquidity.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete and begins in period t = 0. There is an equal mass of innitely lived buyers
and sellers. At t = 0, each seller possesses a single, indivisible asset, which is either of high
(H) or low (L) quality. We refer to a seller with a type j 2 fL;Hg asset as a type j seller.
The fraction of sellers with a high quality asset at t = 0 is q0 2 (0;1). We describe below
the payos to a buyer and a seller from each type of asset.
In every period, each agent's discount factor  is drawn from a continuous and strictly
increasing c.d.f. F with support [0;], where  < 1. These draws are i.i.d. across both agents
and time. This is meant to capture the idea that buyers and sellers have dierent needs at
9See Vincent (1989), Evans (1989), and Deneckere and Liang (2006) for examples of the former type of
model, and Daley and Green (2010), and the references therein, for an example of the latter.
10This basic idea goes back to, at least, Wilson (1980).
8dierent times. At a given time, some sellers may need to sell their asset more urgently than
others, while similarly some buyers may desire immediate consumption more than others.
Across time, each individual agent may be more or less patient in any given period.11
Preferences
An asset of quality j 2 fL;Hg yields ow utility yj to a seller in each period that he holds the
asset. It is convenient to denote the present discounted lifetime value of a type j 2 fL;Hg







dF() < 1. We normalize yL to zero, so that cL = 0. A buyer who purchases
an asset of quality j 2 fL;Hg receives instantaneous utility uj. We assume that
uH > yH + cH; uL > cL = 0; and yH > uL: (2)
The rst two inequalities imply that there are gains from trade in every match, while the
nal inequality implies that the lemons problem is present. Indeed, as long as yH+cH > uL,
the price that buyers are willing to pay for a low quality asset would not be accepted by a
suciently patient high quality seller. When yH > uL, the lemons problem is most severe,
as the price that buyers are willing to pay for a low quality asset would not be accepted by
even the most impatient high quality seller. Relaxing this assumption does not substantively
change any of our results.
There are two aspects of this specication of preferences that warrant discussion. First,
as in Due et al. (2005), buyers and sellers receive dierent levels of utility from holding
a particular asset. This can arise for a multitude of reasons: for example, agents can have
dierent levels of risk aversion, nancing costs, regulatory requirements, or hedging needs.
In addition, the correlation of endowments with asset returns may dier across agents. The
current formulation is a reduced{form representation of such dierences.12
11Note that all types of agents draw their discount factors from the same c.d.f. F. Though non{essential,
we think this is reasonable. For a deeper look at the use of random discount factors, see Higashi et al. (2009).
12For more discussion and examples in which these dierences arise endogenously, see, e.g., Due et al.
(2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), and G^ arleanu (2009).
9Second, we assume that sellers receive ow payos from holding the asset, while buyers
receive an instantaneous payo upon trade. This hybrid specication is done for a number
of reasons. On the one hand, we could easily adapt our analysis to the case where sellers
pay a one{time production cost (cL or cH) when they trade with a buyer, as is standard
in models of lemons markets. The current formulation is more natural for the analysis of
asset markets. On the other hand, we could also assume that buyers receive ow payos
yB
j > yj from owning an asset of type j 2 fL;Hg. As we describe below, buyers exit the
market upon trading, and thus the payo from acquiring an asset would depend on the
buyers' discount factor: the payo to a buyer with discount factor  from acquiring an asset
of type j would be uj() = yB
j +yB
j =(1 E[]). This heterogeneity in buyers' payos would
make the analysis more cumbersome without providing any additional insights. The current
formulation allows for sellers to receive ow payments while they own the asset, without
introducing any additional heterogeneity in the buyers' payos.
Matching and Trade
In every period, after the agents draw their discount factors, buyers and sellers are randomly
and anonymously matched in pairs.13 Discount factors and the quality of the seller's asset
are private information. Once matched, the buyer can oer one of two prices, which are
xed exogenously: a high price ph that we assume lies in the interval (yH + cH;uH), or a
low price p` that we assume lies in the interval (0;uL).14 The seller can accept or reject. If
a seller accepts, trade ensues and the pair exits the market; there is no entry by additional
buyers and sellers. If a seller rejects, no trade occurs and the pair remains in the market.
This ensures that there is always an equal measure of buyers and sellers in the market.15
13Because of our assumption of random discount factors, our environment is a random matching model
with innitely many types. See Podczeck and Puzzello (2010) for a formalization of such models.
14One could imagine that buyers possess two indivisible objects that are worth ph and p` to sellers.
15The use of exogenous prices is common in the literature on matching and bargaining in the presence of
asymmetric information, both in stationary and non{stationary environments, as it allows for much greater
tractability in the analytical characterization of equilibria; see, e.g., Wolinsky (1990), Samuelson (1992), and
Blouin and Serrano (2001).
10We make the following assumptions:
uH   ph > uL   p`; (3)
yH + ph  ph; (4)
(uH   ph)  uL   p`: (5)
The rst assumption implies that, in a world with no information frictions, a buyer would
prefer a high quality asset to a low quality asset given the terms of trade. Though not
necessary for our results, this assumption seems the most natural one. In particular, since a
type H seller rejects p`, (3) implies that uH   ph is the highest payo possible for a buyer.
As we prove in Section 3, the second assumption implies that all sellers accept an oer of
ph regardless of their discount factor; this assumption is useful for tractability, but could be
relaxed without changing the main substantive results presented below. Finally, since we
restrict buyers to oer either p` or ph, we focus our attention on the region of the parameter
space in which they would never prefer to simply not make an oer at all. The inequality in
(5) is a sucient condition for this to be true; it implies that a buyer would always prefer to
at least make an oer of p` at time t, even if he was guaranteed to buy a high quality asset
at price ph in the following period. We return to this last assumption in Section 7, when we
discuss the restriction to two prices more generally.
Strategies and Equilibrium
A history for a buyer is the set of all of his past discount factors and (rejected) price oers.
However, a buyer has no reason to condition behavior on his history: this history is private
information, discount factors are i.i.d., and the probability that he meets his current trading
partner in the future is zero, as there is a continuum of agents. Moreover, since there is
no aggregate uncertainty, the buyer's history of past oers is not helpful in learning any
information about the aggregate state. Thus, a pure strategy for a buyer is a sequence
p = fptg1
t=0, with pt : [0;] ! fp`;phg measurable for all t  0, such that pt() is the buyer's
oer in period t, conditional on still being in the market and drawing discount factor .
A history for a seller is the set of all of his past discount factors and all price oers that
11he has rejected. The same argument as above implies that a seller has no reason to condition






t : [0;]  fp`;phg ! f0;1g measurable for all t  0, such that a
j
t(;p) is the seller's
acceptance decision in period t, conditional on still being in the market, drawing discount
factor , and receiving oer p. We let a
j
t(;p) = 0 denote the seller's decision to reject and
a
j
t(;p) = 1 denote the seller's decision to accept.
We consider symmetric pure{strategy equilibria, which can be described by a list  =
(p;aL;aH).16 In order to dene equilibria, we must determine payos at each date t under
any strategy prole . Though this is a standard calculation for all t in which there is a
positive measure of agents remaining in the market, we must also specify what happens when
there is a zero measure of agents remaining on each side of the market. More specically,
when all remaining agents trade and exit the market in the current period, we must specify
the (expected) payo to an individual should he choose a strategy that results in not trading.
In order to avoid imposing ad hoc assumptions, we adopt the following procedure for
computing these payos. Consider the slightly more general version of our model in which,
in each period t, agents get the opportunity to trade with probability  2 (0;1], where 
is independent of an agent's type and history. The environment we analyze corresponds to
the case in which  = 1. Thus, in every period t, a fraction  2 (0;1] of the buyers and
sellers in the market are matched in pairs, and the remainder do not get the opportunity to
trade. The denition of strategies when  2 (0;1) is the same as when  = 1.17 However,
when  2 (0;1), in every period t there is a strictly positive mass of agents remaining in
the market, and thus payos are always well{dened; in particular, future payos are well{
dened when all buyers and sellers who are matched trade in the current period. We dene
payos when  = 1 as the limit as  converges to 1 of payos when  < 1.
16Since F has no mass points, the restriction to pure strategies is without loss of generality, as at most a
zero mass of agents is indierent between two or more actions in each period. Moreover, with a continuum of
agents, two agents with the same discount factor can behave dierently only if they are indierent between
the possible action choices. Thus, the restriction to symmetric equilibria is also without loss of generality.
17Now a player's strategy at time t is conditional on being matched. Moreover, a history for a player
also includes the periods in which he was able to trade; for the same reasons given above, a player has no
incentive to condition his behavior on this information, though.
12More precisely, given a strategy prole , let V
j
t (aj;) be the expected lifetime payo to
a type j seller in the market in period t following the strategy a and V B
t (pj;) be the same
payo to a buyer in the market in period t following the strategy p when the probability
of trade in each period is  2 (0;1). Both payos are computed before discount factors are
determined in period t. The payo to a type j seller in the market in period t following the
strategy a is then given by
V
j




while the payo to a buyer in the market in period t following the strategy p is
V
B




See the Supplementary Appendix for the construction of V
j
t (aj;) and V B
t (pj;) and a
proof that the limits (6) and (7) are well{dened regardless of a, p, and .










t(pj) is the likelihood that a seller of type j in the market in period t
accepts an oer p 2 fp`;phg. Now let T() be the period in which the market \clears,"
i.e., the period in which all sellers remaining in the market accept the price oers made
by the buyers; we set T() = 1 if the market never clears. Moreover, let qt() be the
fraction of type H sellers in the market in period t. Finally, let V B




t () = V
j
t (ajj). We can now dene an equilibrium in our environment.18










rium if for each t 2 f0;:::;T()g and j 2 fL;Hg, we have that:







































18Note that, in the denition below, we assume that a seller accepts any oer that he is indierent between
accepting and rejecting. This is without loss since F has no mass points, and so the probability that a seller is
ever indierent between accepting and rejecting is zero. Also note that we only require sequential rationality
when there is a positive mass of agents in the market. We obtain the same results if we also require sequential
rationality when the mass of agents in the market is zero.
13(ii) for each p 2 fp`;phg and  2 [0;], a
j
t (;p) = 1 if, and only if,




In words, the strategy prole  is an equilibrium if the behavior of buyers and sellers is
optimal in every period t  T(). Indeed, the term in (i) is the expected payo to a buyer
in the market in period t when his discount factor is  and he oers p 2 fp`;phg: conditional
on being matched to a type j seller, an oer of p is accepted with probability A
j
t(pj), in
which case the buyer's payo is uj  p, and rejected with probability 1  A
j
t(pj), in which
case the buyer's payo is V B
t+1(). Likewise, the optimal behavior for a seller in the market
in period t is to accept an oer of p if, and only if, this oer is at least as high as the payo
he obtains from holding on to his asset for another period.
3 Basic Properties of Equilibria
In this section, we establish that the market clears in nite time in every equilibrium and
that the fraction of type H sellers in the population is strictly increasing over time before
the market clears. We start with the following result.
Lemma 1. Suppose the market has not cleared before period t and that the fraction of type
H sellers in the market is positive. The market clears in period t if, and only if, all buyers
in the market oer ph.
Suppose a positive fraction of buyers oer p`. Since matching is random, some of them
will be matched with type H sellers, who always reject an oer of p` because of (2). Hence,
a positive fraction of buyers who oer p` have their oer rejected, and thus the market does
not clear. We show in the Appendix that V
j
t ()  ph for any strategy prole . Thus, since
ph  yH + ph by (4), in equilibrium all sellers accept an oer of ph.
By Lemma 1, for any equilibrium , the market clears in the rst period T in which all
remaining buyers in the market oer ph. For all t < T, a positive mass of buyers oer p` and





. Since all sellers who
14receive an oer of ph accept the oer and exit the market, we then have that if qt = qt(),
then qt+1 = qt+1() is given by
qt+1 =
qt







Now notice that V L
t+1()  ph implies that for all t < T, the fraction of type L sellers
who accept an oer of p` is at least F(p`=ph), and thus bounded away from zero. Looking
at the law of motion for fqtgT
t=0, equation (8), the following result follows immediately given
that q0 2 (0;1).
Lemma 2. For any equilibrium , the sequence fqtgT
t=0 is strictly increasing.
This result is a common feature of dynamic models of trade with adverse selection: since
the opportunity cost (the foregone dividends) of selling a high quality asset is larger than
that of selling a low quality asset, type H sellers are de facto more patient and remain in the
market, on average, longer than type L sellers. As a result, over time the average quality of
assets in the market increases.19 As we now show, this implies that the market eventually
clears in every equilibrium. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium, the market clears in nite time.
Intuitively, if the market never clears, then it must be that the mass of buyers who oer
p` is strictly positive in every period t. Moreover, since qt is strictly increasing, the sequence
fqtg1
t=0 must converge to some q1  1. Given that buyers discount the future ( < 1), it
must be that q1 < 1; otherwise, as qt gets suciently close to one, the gain from waiting for
the market to improve vanishes, and it becomes a strictly dominant strategy for all buyers to
oer ph. However, if q1 < 1, the law of motion (8) implies that as t gets large, the fraction
of type L sellers who accept p` gets arbitrarily close to zero, which is not possible.
19Lemma 2 does not depend on the assumption of exogenous prices, nor does it depend on the assumption
that uL < yH. Indeed, if the continuation payo to a type j seller from staying in the market is V j, then
the fraction of type j sellers who accept an oer of p is F((p   yj)=V j). Since yH > yL = 0 and a type H
seller can always replicate the behavior of a type L seller, it is necessarily the case that V H > V L. Thus,
F((p yH)=V H) < F(p=V L), and so as long as the market does not clear, the fraction of type L sellers who
exit the market in any period is greater than the fraction of type H sellers who do the same.
154 Characterizing Equilibria
In this section, we provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium set. The rst step
consists in characterizing the equilibria in which the market clears in the rst period of trade,
i.e., all buyers oer ph in t = 0. We refer to such equilibria as \0{step" equilibria; more
generally, we refer to equilibria in which the market clears in period k as \k{step" equilibria.
Then we use the fact that a (k+1){step equilibrium must be such that (i) some agents oer
p` at t = 0, and (ii) behavior after the rst period of trade is given by a k{step equilibrium
to construct the set of 1{step equilibria, and so on. Since the market clears in nite time
in any equilibrium, this recursive procedure exhausts the equilibrium set. All proofs in this
section are relegated to the Appendix.
Zero{step equilibria
Denote by B
i (q;;vL;vH;vB) the payo to a buyer who oers pi, with i 2 f`;hg, when: (i)
the fraction of type H sellers in the market is q 2 (0;1); (ii) the buyer's discount factor is ;
(iii) the continuation payo to a seller of type j who chooses not to trade is vj; and (iv) the
continuation payo to the buyer should he not trade is vB. Since a type j seller can hold his
asset forever, vj  cj. Also note that vB  uH   ph and, since a buyer can always oer p`
and trade at least with probability F(p`=ph) > 0, it follows that vB > 0.
Since sellers always accept an oer of ph, we have that

B
h (q;;vL;vH;vB)  
B
h (q) = q(uH   ph) + (1   q)(uL   ph):
We also know that a type H seller always rejects an oer of p`. Therefore,

B
` (q;;vL;vH;vB)  
B
` (q;;vL;vB)





[uL   p`] +









where F(p`=vL) is the fraction of type L sellers who accept p`. Note that B
` (q;;vL;vB) is
strictly increasing in vB. Since vB > 0, B
` (q;;vL;vB) is also positive and strictly increasing
in . Moreover, since vB  uH   ph, (5) implies that vB  uL   p`, and so B
` (q;;vL;vB)
is non{increasing in vL.
16Let v0
B(q0) and v0
j(q0) be the payos to buyers and type j sellers in a 0{step equilibrium,
respectively.20 It is easy to see that v0
B(q0) = B
h (q0) and v0
j(q0)  v0
j = ph:21 To construct
the set of 0{step equilibria, consider the strategy 0 in which, in every t  0, pt() = ph for
all  2 [0;] and type j sellers accept an oer p if, and only if,   (p yj)=ph. It follows from
our renement for computing payos when the mass of agents in the market is zero that for
all t  1, V B
t (0) = v0
B(q0) and V
j
t (0) = v0
j. Indeed, under 0, when the fraction of buyers
and sellers who are matched in each period is  < 1, all buyers who get the opportunity to
trade exit the market, and so the fraction of type H sellers among the sellers who remain in
the market stays the same. Hence, the strategy prole 0 is an equilibrium only if v0
B(q0) > 0
and all buyers nd it optimal to oer ph in t = 0, which is true as long as, for all  2 [0;],

B












B(q0) > 0 implies that B
` (q0;;v0
L;v0
B(q0)) is strictly increasing in , a necessary and
sucient condition for 0 to be an equilibrium is that v0
B(q0) > 0 and

B











In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that there exists a unique q0 2 (0;1) such that (10)
is satised if, and only if, q0  q0. Moreover, we show that v0
B(q0) > 0, and so v0
B(q0) > 0 for
all q0  q0. Thus, 0 is an equilibrium if, and only if, q0 2 [q0;1). Finally, we also show that
(10) is the loosest possible constraint on q0 that ensures that a buyer nds it optimal to oer
ph at t = 0 when all other buyers in the market oer ph as well. In other words, no strategy
prole e 0 such that all buyers oer ph in t = 0 is an equilibrium when (10) is violated.
20In general, we will adopt the convention that a numerical subscript refers to a particular time period,
while a numerical superscript refers to the number of periods it takes for the market to clear in equilibrium.
In addition, we will use lower case v to denote equilibrium payos.
21Note that, for a given q0, there may be multiple 0{step equilibria that dier in how they specify behavior
o the equilibrium path (i.e., for t  1). However, for a given q0, all such equilibria are outcome equivalent;
two equilibria  and 0 are outcome equivalent if T() = T(0) = T and for all t  T, the buyers and sellers
in the market behave in the same way under both strategy proles. Since we use the set of 0{step equilibria
to construct the set of 1{step equilibria, this multiplicity also exists for 1{step equilibria, but for a given
q0, the latter equilibria are outcome equivalent as well. This is true, more generally, for all k  0. In the
analysis below, we mainly ignore this trivial multiplicity; however, we will explore in great detail cases in
which, for a given q0, there exist multiple equilibria that are not outcome equivalent.
17Proposition 1. Let q0 2 (0;1) denote the unique value of q0 satisfying (10) with equality.
There exists a 0{step equilibrium if, and only if, q0  q0.
Notice that q0uH + (1   q0)uL  ph > yH + cH for any q0 in the interval [q0;1), since
a buyer is only willing to oer ph if his payo from doing so is non{negative. Hence, ph
corresponds to a market{clearing price in a competitive equilibrium. Thus, when the lemons
problem is relatively small, i.e., when q0 is suciently large, the equilibrium outcome in
this dynamic decentralized market coincides with that of a static, frictionless market: trade
occurs instantaneously at a single market{clearing price. We will now show, however, that
as the lemons problem becomes more severe, equilibrium outcomes no longer resemble those
of a centralized competitive market. Instead, these outcomes appear more consistent with
models of decentralized trade with search frictions, in the sense that it takes time for buyers
and sellers to trade, and they do so at potentially dierent prices.
One{step equilibria
To characterize the set of 1{step equilibria, the following convention will be useful: for any
strategy prole , let + be the strategy prole such that for all t  0, the agents' behavior




q + (1   q)[1   F (p`=vL)]
: (11)
By construction, q+(q;vL) is the fraction of type H sellers in the market in the next period if
this fraction is q in the current period, a positive mass of buyers oer p`, and the continuation
payo to a type L seller in case he rejects a price oer is vL. Since vL  ph, we have that
F(p`=vL)  F(p`=ph) > 0, and so q+(q;vL) > q for all q 2 (0;1). Also note that q+(q;vL) is
strictly increasing in q if p`=vL <  and q+(q;vL)  1 if p`=vL  .
Consider a strategy prole 1 such that a positive mass of buyers oer p` in t = 0 and
all buyers oer ph in t = 1. In order for 1 to be an equilibrium, it must be that: (i) 1
+ is
a 0{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0 = q+(q0;v0
L); and (ii) a
positive mass of buyers nd it optimal to oer p` in t = 0 when the market clears in t = 1.22
22It must also be the case that the type j sellers accept an oer of p in t = 0 if, and only if,   (p yj)=ph.
18Formally, the following conditions are necessary and sucient for 1 to be an equilibrium:
q+(q0;v0
L) = q0 (12)
q0  q0 (13)
B








The rst condition is simply the law of motion for qt from t = 0 to t = 1. Since v0
L = ph
is a constant, the law of motion q+(q0;v0
L) is a continuous, strictly increasing function of
q0 specifying the unique implied value of q1 in a candidate 1{step equilibrium. The second
condition follows from Proposition 1. It ensures that the fraction of type H sellers in t = 1
falls in the region of 0{step equilibria. The third condition ensures that a positive mass of
buyers nd it optimal to oer p` in t = 0 when the strategy prole under play is 1. Since
q0  q0 implies that v0
B(q0) > 0, B
` (q0;;v0
L;v0
B(q0)) is strictly increasing in . Thus, the
incentive of a buyer to oer p` in t = 0 when the market clears in t = 1 increases with
the buyer's patience. As it turns out, combining (12) and (13) provides a lower bound on
the values of q0 for which a 1{step equilibrium exists, and (14) provides an upper bound.
Proposition 2 below formalizes these results.
Proposition 2. Let q1 denote the unique value of q0 satisfying (14) with equality, and dene
q1 to be such that q+(q1;v0
L) = q0 if p`=v0
L <  and q1 = 0 otherwise. Then q1 < q0 < q1 < 1
and there exists a 1{step equilibrium if, and only if, q0 2 [q1;q1)\(0;1). Moreover, for each
q0 2 [q1;q1) \ (0;1), there exists a unique q0 2 [q0;1] such that q0 is the value of q1 in any
1{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0.
In words, if q0 = q1, then the most patient buyer is exactly indierent between oering
p` and ph when a positive mass of other buyers are oering p`. For any q0 > q1, the payo to
such a buyer from immediately trading at price ph is greater than the payo from oering p`
and not trading with positive probability, in which case the buyer trades at price ph in the
ensuing period (when the fraction of type H sellers in the market is larger). When p`=v0
L < ,
q1 is the unique value of q0 such that, if a positive mass of buyers oer p`, then the fraction of
This optimal behavior of sellers will be implicitly assumed throughout the analysis.
19high quality sellers in the next period is q0, the minimum value required for market clearing;
notice that q1 > 0 in this case. If even the most patient type L seller would rather accept
an oer of p` today than wait one period for an oer of ph, i.e., if p`=v0
L  , then q1 = 0.




. In this region, if all other buyers are oering ph, the payos to trading at t = 0
and at t = 1 are the same, and so it is optimal for an individual buyer to oer ph no matter
his discount factor. However, if a positive mass of other buyers are oering p`, the market
does not clear at t = 0 and the payo to trading at t = 1 increases (since q1 > q0), rendering
it optimal for patient buyers to oer p` and incur a chance that they trade only in the next
period. We return to this point in Section 5.
We know from above that in every 1{step equilibrium, Q1
+(q0)  q+(q0;v0
L) is the value
of q1 corresponding to each initial value q0. Moreover, for each value of q1, payos at t = 1
are uniquely dened, since all 0{step equilibria are outcome equivalent. Therefore, it follows
that the payos in a 1{step equilibrium are uniquely dened for each q0. The payo to a























































It turns out that 1 is continuous and increasing in q0, with limq0!q1 1(q0) = 1, which implies
that v1
L is also continuous and increasing in q0, with limq0!q1 v1
L(q0) = v0
L. Lemma 4 in the
appendix establishes these results formally, as well as some additional properties of v1
B that
are useful in constructing 2{step equilibria. In what follows, we let v1
L(q1) = limq0!q1 v1
L(q0).
In addition, note that the payo to a high quality seller is simply v1
H(q0) = 1(q0)ph +
(1 1(q0))
R
phdF(). Since the behavior of type H sellers is trivial, we will not explicitly
derive their payos in what follows.
20Two{step equilibria
We now provide a complete characterization of 2{step equilibria. As it turns out, the process
of characterizing k{step equilibria is nearly identical for all k  2. Thus, the methodology
developed here will allow for a complete characterization of equilibria in the next subsection.
Consider a strategy prole 2 such that a positive mass of buyers oer p` in t = 0 and
t = 1, and then all buyers oer ph in t = 2. In order for 2 to be an equilibrium, it must
satisfy the following three necessary and sucient conditions:
q+ (q0;v1














The rst condition is the analog of (12); it is the law of motion for qt from t = 0 to t = 1,
conditional on a 1{step equilibrium beginning at t = 1. Unlike (12), the fraction q0 in (15)
is the solution to a xed point problem: if the type L sellers expect continuation payos to
be that of a 1{step equilibrium in which the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0, then the
fraction of type L sellers who accept an oer of p` in t = 0 must be such that this conjecture
is correct. This xed point problem does not appear in (12) since v0
L(q) is independent of q.
The second condition ensures that there exists a 1{step equilibrium at t = 1 given an initial
fraction q0 of high quality assets. The nal condition ensures that a positive mass of buyers
nd it optimal to oer p` in t = 0 when 2




L for all q0 2 [q1;q1)\(0;1), we have that p`=v0
L   implies that
q+(q0;v1
L(q0)) = 1 for all q0 2 [q1;q1)\(0;1). Thus, no 2{step equilibrium exists if pL=v0
L  .
Intuitively, when p`=v0
L  , all type L sellers with  <  strictly prefer to accept on oer of
p` if continuation payos are that of a 1{step equilibrium. Therefore, the fraction of type H
sellers in the market at t = 1 is one, and the market clears in two periods.
Suppose then that p`=v0
L < . We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that (15) and (16)
imply (17). Intuitively, the incentive of the most patient buyer to choose p` in t = 0 is even
greater than his incentive to choose p` in t = 1, when the fraction of type H sellers in the
21market is q0 > q0. Hence, if the most patient buyer strictly prefers to choose p` in t = 1,
which is true by (16), then he also strictly prefers to oer p` at t = 0 and (17) is satised.
Therefore, (15) and (16) are necessary and sucient conditions for a 2{step equilibrium.
Let Q2
+ : q0 7! q0 denote the map dened by (15); in words, Q2
+(q0) is the value of q1
in a 2{step equilibrium, given q0. In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that Q2
+(q0) is a
well{dened function that is both continuous and strictly increasing in q0. Therefore, for
any q0, there is a unique value of q1 in any candidate 2{step equilibrium. These properties of
Q2
+(q0) greatly simplify the characterization of 2{step equilibria: the necessary and sucient
conditions (15) and (16) become Q2
+(q0)  q1 and Q2
+(q0) < q1. Hence, the lower bound on
q0 for which a 2{step equilibrium exists is the value of q0 such that Q2
+(q0) = q1, while the
upper bound is the value of q0 such that Q2
+(q0) = q1. The proposition below summarizes.
Proposition 3. Suppose that  > p`=v0
L. Let q2 be the unique solution to q+(q2;v1
L(q1)) = q1,
and dene q2 to be such that q+(q2;v1
L(q1)) = q1 if p`=v1
L(q1) <  and q2 = 0 otherwise. Then
q2 < q1 < q2 < q1 and there exists a 2{step equilibrium if, and only if, q0 2 [q2;q2) \ (0;1).
Moreover, for each q0 2 [q2;q2) \ (0;1), there exists a unique q0 2 [q1;q1) such that q0 is the
value of q1 in any 2{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0.
Figure 2 below provides some intuition for the equilibrium characterization so far. After
deriving q0 and q1, we identied q1 as the value of q0 that would \land" exactly on q0 at
t = 1 given the law of motion Q1
+(q0). Since this law of motion is continuous and strictly
increasing in q0 (for  > p`=v0
L), we are assured that any q0 > q1 will \land" at q0 > q0
in a candidate 1{step equilibrium. Moving backwards, we then identied q2 and q2 as the
values of q0 that would \land" exactly on q1 and q1, respectively, given the law of motion
Q2
+(q0). Though this law of motion is slightly more complicated, the fact that it remains
continuous and strictly increasing assures us that any q0 2

q2;q2
will \land" within the
region of 1{step equilibrium. Finally, since v1
L(q1) = v0












the fact that q2 > q1 follows immediately from the fact that q+(q0;vL) is strictly increasing
in q0 for any vL such that p`=vL < .
22q0
0 1
q1 q1 q2 q2
Figure 2: Deriving Bounds on Equilibrium Regions
Since Q2
+(q0) is uniquely dened, so too are payos in a 2{step equilibrium: the payo





























































As in the case of 1{step equilibria, it turns out that 2 is continuous and increasing in q0, with
limq0!q2 2(q0) = 1(q2), so that the payo v2
L is also continuous and increasing in q0, with
v2
L(q2)  limq0!q2 v2
L(q0) = v1
L(q2). Lemma 5 in the appendix establishes these properties
formally, as well as some additional properties of v2
B and v2
L that are useful in what follows.
A Full Characterization
The characterization of k{step equilibria for k  3 proceeds by induction and follows almost
exactly the characterization of 2{step equilibria. Hence, for ease of exposition, we just sketch
the process here and leave the details for the Appendix.
Suppose there exists k  3 such that for all s  k  1, a s{step equilibrium exists if, and
only if, q0 2 [qs;qs) \ (0;1), where qs  qs 1 < qs < qs 1. Let vs
L and vs
B be, respectively,
23the payo functions to type L sellers and buyers in a s{step equilibrium. The functions
vs
L and vs
B satisfy the properties of v2
L and v2
B described in Lemma 5 (in the Appendix); in
particular, vs
L is continuous and strictly increasing in q0. As in the case of 2{step equilibria,
























L is increasing in q0, p`=v
k 1
L (q0)  p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) for all q0 2 [qk 1;qk 1)\(0;1).
Hence, p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1)   implies that q+(q0;v
k 1
L (q0)) = 1 for all q0 2 [qk 1;qk 1) \ (0;1), in
which case there exists no k{step equilibrium.
Suppose then that p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) < . As we prove in the Appendix, given the charac-
teristics of (k   1){step equilibria, all the crucial features of 2{step equilibria are true for
k{step equilibria. First, (18) and (19) imply (20). Second, if we dene Qk
+ : q0 7! q0 as
the map implied by (18), then Qk
+ is continuous and strictly increasing. This implies that
a k{step equilibrium exists if, and only if, q0 2 [qk;qk) \ (0;1), where the lower bound qk is
such that q+(qk;v
k 1
L (qk 1)) = qk 1 if p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) <  and qk = 0 otherwise, and the upper
bound qk satises q+(qk;v
k 1
L (qk 1)) = qk 1, where v
k 1
L (qk 1)  limq!qk 1 v
k 1
L (q); note that
qk  qk 1 and qk < qk 1 by denition. Finally, we have that qk 1 < qk.
We know from above that given q0 2 [qk;qk) \ (0;1), Qk
+(q0) 2 [qk 1;qk 1) \ (0;1) is the
value of q1 in any k{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0. Thus,






























































24is the fraction of buyers who oer ph at t = 0. Crucially, vk
B, vk
L, and k have the same
properties that we establish for v2
B, v2
L and 2 in Lemma 5, which allows us to proceed by
induction. We begin this inductive process for k = 3, and continue as long as p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) <
, which ensures qk > 0 and thus the existence of a k{step equilibrium. The following theorem
provides a full characterization of the equilibrium set.
Theorem 1. There exists 1  K < 1 and sequences fqkgK
k=0 and fqkgK
k=0, with q0 = 1,
qK = 0, and qk  qk 1 < qk < qk 1 for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg, such that a k{step equilibrium
exists if, and only if, q0 2 [qk;qk)\(0;1). Moreover, for each q0 2 [qk;qk)\(0;1), there exists
a unique q0 2 [qk 1;qk 1) such that q0 = Qk
+(q0) is the value of q1 in any k{step equilibrium
when the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0.
The payos for buyers and type L sellers are uniquely dened in every equilibrium and
are determined recursively as follows: (i) v0
B(q0) = B
h (q0) and v0
L(q0)  ph; (ii) for each
k 2 f1;:::;Kg, vk
B and vk




k=1 are dened recursively as follows: (i) q0 is the unique
value of q0 for which B







and, for each k 2 f1;:::;Kg, qk is such
that q+(qk;v
k 1
L (qk 1)) = qk 1 if p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) < , and qk = 0 otherwise; (ii) q1 is the only
value of q0 for which B








and, for each k 2 f2;:::;Kg, qk
is such that q+(qk;v
k 1
L (qk 1)) = qk 1. Finally, K = maxfk : p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) < g.
Theorem 1 oers a complete characterization of the equilibrium set. In particular, it
species a sequence of cutos that partition the interval (0;1) into regions such that, for all
q0 in one such region, there exists an equilibrium in which the market takes the same number
of periods k to clear. Figure 3 below illustrates these cutos for the case in which uH = 1,
ph = 0:6, uL = 0:42, p` = 0:05, and F is uniformly distributed over [0;0:5]. In addition
to plotting these cutos, we have also highlighted the maximum and minimum number of
periods it takes before the market clears for each q0 2 (0;1).
Notice that there is a natural monotonicity to the equilibria in the above example: for any
0 < q0 < q0
0 < 1, if there exists a k{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of high quality
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Cutos
of high quality assets is q0
0. This is true in general since qk is strictly decreasing in k by
Theorem 1, and so an increase in q0 reduces the maximum number of periods it takes for the
market to clear. Also notice that in the example, the market clears in at most four periods.
However, depending on the distribution F and parameters of the model, market clearing
can take a large number of periods when q0 is small. We show this in the Supplementary
Appendix.
5 Discussion
We now illustrate how the theory developed above can provide insight into a number of
important issues. First we study how the initial composition of assets in the market aects
the expected amount of time it takes to sell|or the illiquidity of|high quality assets. Then
we study the dynamics of trade for a given value of q0, exploring the model's implications for
how prices, trading volume, and average quality evolve over time in this type of environment.
Establishing such a benchmark is important, as it not only allows us to understand how frozen
markets can thaw over time on their own, but also provides a framework to formally analyze
the eects of various policies intended to unfreeze such markets; we discuss one particular
policy intervention in the next section. Finally, the existence of multiple equilibria for a given
value of q0 suggests that coordination failures can exacerbate liquidity problems in dynamic,
decentralized markets with adverse selection. Since such multiplicity does not arise in several
26closely related (and well{known) environments, we end this section with a discussion of those
features of our framework that are crucial for generating these coordination failures.
Liquidity and Lemons
Here we study how the fraction of lemons in the market aects the liquidity of high quality
assets.23 An asset is typically considered liquid if it can be sold quickly and at little discount.
In many models, trade is instantaneous by construction, and thus the only measure of liq-
uidity is the dierence between the actual market price and the price in some frictionless
benchmark; in these models, time is a margin that simply cannot adjust.24 In the current
model, the opposite is true: since ph is the only price that type H sellers accept, the ap-
propriate measure of liquidity for these assets is the expected amount of time it takes to
sell them. We derive this statistic below and use it to study the relationship between the
severity of the lemons problem (i.e., the value of q0) and the liquidity of high quality assets.
Consider a k{step equilibrium with initial fraction q0 2

qk;qk
\ (0;1) of high quality
assets, and dene the sequence fqtgk
t=1 by qt = Q
k t+1
+ (qt 1) for t 2 f1;:::;kg. By con-
struction, qt is the fraction of high quality assets in the market in period t. Therefore, the













where k(q) is the fraction of buyers who oer ph in the rst period of trade in a k{step
equilibrium when the starting fraction of type H sellers is q. The expected number of








23Focusing on the ability to sell high quality assets is standard in this literature, going back to Akerlof
(1970). Of course, a seller can always sell a low quality asset instantaneously at price p`.
24In the nance literature, the typical measure of liquidity is the (inverse of) the bid{ask spread, which can
be generated by exogenous transaction costs (see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Constantinides
(1986)), asymmetric information (see Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), or search frictions (see
Due et al. (2005)), among other things. Eisfeldt (2004) provides an alternative denition, but also in a
model in which trade is instantaneous; see the discussion of this model in the Related Literature section.
27We know from the proof of Theorem 1 that, in any k{step equilibrium, both k(q0) and
Qk
+(q0) are increasing in q0. Hence, an increase in q0 implies an increase in the fraction of
buyers who oer ph in the rst period of trade. Moreover, an increase in q0 also leads to
an increase in qt for all t 2 f1;:::;kg, which in turn implies an increase in the fraction of
buyers who oer ph in every period before the market clears. Taken together, these two facts
help to establish that Ek
H(q0) is a decreasing function of q0; we present a formal proof of this
result in Lemma 6 in the Appendix.
As we established earlier, for some values of q0 there exist multiple equilibria that take
a dierent number of periods for the market to clear. This, of course, makes comparing the
liquidity of high quality assets across dierent values of q0 dicult. Here we do not take a
stance on equilibrium selection and instead focus on the relationship between the minimum






H(q0) : 9 a k{step equilibrium given q0
	
:
In Lemma 7 in the Appendix we use the fact that Ek
H(q0) is decreasing in q0 to show that
E(q0) is decreasing in q0. Thus, a reduction in the initial fraction of high quality assets
reduces their liquidity in the sense that it increases the smallest expected amount of time it
takes to sell them.25
The Dynamics of Trade
We now illustrate typical market dynamics for a given value of q0. The numerical example of
Section 4 is a convenient vehicle for conveying the intuition; we choose q0 = 0:1, which falls
within the set of 3{step equilibria. The average price in period t 2 f0;:::;kg in a k{step










25Alternatively, one could compare the liquidity of high quality assets across dierent values of q0 by
applying a rule that selects a particular value of k for each q0. For example, if we let kmax(q0) =
maxfk : 9 a k{step equilibrium given q0g and dene Emax(q0) = E
kmax(q0)
H (q0), it is possible to show that
Emax(q0) is also decreasing in q0.
28where, as above, fqtgk
t=1 is the sequence such that qt = Q
k t+1
+ (qt 1) for t 2 f1;:::;kg. In
gure 4 below, we plot the evolution of qt and p
avg
t in the example.
In the rst two periods of trade, the fraction of high quality assets is suciently low
that all buyers oer p`. All type H sellers and patient type L sellers reject this oer, but
suciently impatient type L sellers accept, causing the average quality of assets in the market
to be higher in the following period. In the third period of trade, the fraction of high quality
assets is suciently high that some impatient buyers oer ph, increasing the average price.
Still, patient buyers continue to oer p` and (perhaps) wait for market conditions to improve.
In the fourth period of trade, all remaining buyers oer ph and the market clears. Thus,
average prices increase over time along with average quality. In the example, the price path
exhibits an S{shape: prices are persistently low in early periods, and then quickly increase
in the latter stages of trade.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Many of the features of the above example are true in general. We know from the proof
of Theorem 1 that k(q)  k 1(Qk
+(q)) for any k{step equilibrium. Hence, the fraction of
buyers who oer ph increases over time, so that p
avg












then only low quality assets are exchanged in the rst period of trade. The trade of high
quality assets remains frozen until the rst period in which myopic buyers nd it strictly
optimal to oer ph.
Multiplicity of Equilibria
The presence of multiple equilibria for some values of q0 suggests that liquidity problems can
be exacerbated by coordination failures. At the heart of this multiplicity is the fact that the
behavior of an individual buyer depends on the future composition of assets in the market,
which in turn is determined by the aggregate behavior of buyers.
29Identifying the ingredients of our framework that lead to multiple equilibria|that there
are many buyers, and that these buyers are forward{looking|is helpful in understanding
why such multiplicity does not typically arise in certain related environments. For example,
in models of bargaining with asymmetric information in which there is only one buyer and
one seller (see, e.g., Vincent (1989), Evans (1989), and Deneckere and Liang (2006)), clearly
there is no scope for coordination between buyers' actions; as a result, there is typically a
unique sequential equilibrium in these models. Alternatively, in similar frameworks in which
a single seller with private information meets a sequence of buyers (see, e.g., H orner and
Vieille (2009) and the references therein), the buyers are typically assumed to be myopic.
As a result, there is no potential for buyers to coordinate their behavior based on future
payos, and again the type of multiplicity that we nd here does not emerge.26
6 Application: The Market for Legacy Assets
The theory developed above provides a parsimonious framework to study the role that asym-
metric information played in disrupting trade in the market for asset{backed securities during
the nancial crisis that began in 2007. Since our model provides a formal treatment of how
a frozen market can thaw over time on its own, it also provides an ideal environment to
analyze how various government interventions aect this process. To illustrate this point, in
this section we assess the theoretical implications of a policy that was recently implemented
in an attempt to restore liquidity in the market for asset{backed securities. We should note
that there is nothing special per se about the policy we consider, over and above the fact
that it was actually implemented. However, as our exercise produces some surprising results,
we believe it underscores the need for explicit models to formally analyze the implications
of intervention in these types of markets.
26The two ingredients we identify are not sucient for multiplicity. For example, in Janssen and Roy
(2002), there is a continuum of forward{looking buyers and sellers who trade in a sequence of centralized
markets in the presence of asymmetric information. However, their equilibrium requires that buyers receive
zero expected payos from trading at any date, thus precluding the possibility of the multiplicity we nd in
our model. The two ingredients are also not necessary. Gerardi et al. (2010) show that multiple equilibria
arise in sequential bargaining with asymmetric information when the party that makes the oers is the
informed one; signalling is the source of multiplicity in their environment.
30Our model shares many features of the markets for asset{backed securities. For one,
buyers and sellers in this market negotiate bilaterally, as opposed to trading against their
budget constraint in a competitive, centralized market where the law of one price prevails.
Moreover, the market is inherently dynamic and non{stationary: there is a relatively xed
stock of assets of a particular vintage, and the manner in which the composition of assets
remaining in the market evolves over time aects both prices and the incentive of market
participants to delay trade. Finally, many believe that the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion contributed to the illiquidity in this market. The decline of housing prices in various
parts of the country introduced considerable heterogeneity into the quality of residential
mortgage{backed securities, and many of the usual buyers of these assets did not possess the
expertise to comfortably value the assets that were being oered by nancial institutions.27
As a result, both the prices and the volume of these assets being sold quickly dropped.28
The lack of liquidity in this market posed a threat to the economy at large. The Treasury
department described the \challenge of legacy assets" as follows:
One major reason [for the prolonged recession] is the problem of \legacy
assets"|both real estate loans held directly on the books of banks (\legacy
loans") and securities backed by loan portfolios (\legacy securities"). These as-
sets create uncertainty around the balance sheets of these nancial institutions,
compromising their ability to raise capital and their willingness to increase lend-
ing... As a result, a negative cycle has developed where declining asset prices
have triggered further deleveraging, which has in turn led to further price de-
clines. The excessive discounts embedded in some legacy asset prices are now
straining the capital of U.S. nancial institutions, limiting their ability to lend
and increasing the cost of credit throughout the nancial system.
In response to this problem, the Treasury department introduced the Public{Private Invest-
27The nancial institutions that were selling these assets often had a team of analysts that had purchased
the underlying assets (e.g., mortgages), studied their properties, and worked closely with the rating agencies
to bundle them into more opaque nal products. An extreme example of this asymmetric information is the
\Abacus" deal, in which Goldman Sachs created and sold collateralized debt obligations to investors while
simultaneously betting against them. In general, there are many reasons to believe that nancial institutions
often have better information about the quality of their assets than potential buyers, perhaps because they
learn about the asset while they own it (as argued by Bolton et al. (2011)), or because they conduct research
about the asset in anticipation of selling it (as argued by Guerrieri and Shimer (2010)). By now, there is a
large literature on the role of asymmetric information in the nancial crisis; see, e.g., Gorton (2009) and the
references therein.
28For a detailed analysis, see Krishnamurthy (2010).
31ment Program for Legacy Assets. Under this program, the government issued non{recourse
loans to private investors to assist in buying legacy assets, with a minimum fraction of the
purchase price being nanced by the investor's own equity. This program essentially subsi-
dizes the buyer's purchase and partially insures his downside loss; if the asset turns out to be
a lemon, the buyer can default and incur only a fraction of the total loss from the purchase
(his equity investment). The Treasury department described the \merits of this approach"
as follows:
This approach is superior to the alternatives of either hoping for banks to
gradually work these assets o their books or of the government purchasing the
assets directly. Simply hoping for banks to work legacy assets o over time risks
prolonging a nancial crisis, as in the case of the Japanese experience. But if the
government acts alone in directly purchasing legacy assets, taxpayers will take
on all the risk of such purchases|along with the additional risk that taxpayers
will overpay if government employees are setting the price for those assets.
In an attempt to capture this policy response, suppose now that a buyer who pays price
p for an asset can borrow (1   )p from the government. For simplicity, assume the buyer
observes the quality of the asset immediately after buying it and then faces the following
choice: either pay back the loan to the government, or default on the loan and surrender
the asset. A buyer who pays price p for a type j asset repays his loan if, and only if,
uj   (1   )p > 0. Thus, a buyer who receives a high quality asset always repays his loan,
as does a buyer who pays p` for a low quality asset. However, a buyer who pays ph for a
low quality asset defaults if   1   uL=ph. Therefore, this policy amounts to a transfer
 = (1   )ph   uL 2 [0;ph   uL] to the buyers who pay ph for a low quality asset.
Denote the payo to a buyer from oering ph given a transfer  by

B
h (q0;) = q0(uH   ph) + (1   q0)(uL   ph + ):
The payo to a buyer from oering p` is still given by (9), and the characterization of the
equilibrium set proceeds in exactly the same way as in Section 4. In particular, Theorem 1
is still valid with the only dierence that now, in the recursive procedure that determines




L(q0;) be, respectively, the payos to buyers and type L sellers in a
k{step equilibrium when the transfer is . Moreover, let qk() and qk() be, respectively,
the lower and upper cutos for a k{step equilibrium as a function of . The cuto q0() is
the unique value of q0 such that
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L(q0;)  ph. The cutos q1() and q1() are the unique values of q0 satisfying













It is straightforward to show that q0(), q1(), and q1() are decreasing in . Therefore, if
the initial fraction of high quality assets is suciently large, an increase in  can decrease
the amount of time it takes for the market to clear, and thus increase market liquidity. For
example, for  2 (0;ph   uL), there exists a 0{step equilibrium when q0 2 (q0();q0(0)),
whereas the market would take at least one additional period to clear if  = 0. Intuitively,
since the transfer  increases the payo from oering ph, buyers are more willing to oer the
high price given any fraction of lemons in the market.
However, the policy under consideration has a second, opposing eect. Since buyers are
more willing to oer ph when they are partially insured against buying a lemon, the average
price sellers receive in the future increases as  grows larger. Ceteris paribus, this makes
sellers more likely to reject oers of p` in early rounds of trade, opting instead to wait for
larger payos later in the game. To see this, let 1(q0;) be the mass of buyers who oer ph
in the rst period of trade in a 1{step equilibrium when the transfer is . The payo to a














Straightforward algebra shows that 1(q0;), and thus v1
L(q0;), are increasing in .











33Thus, as  increases, two opposing forces are at work. On the one hand, since q1 is decreasing
in , this tends to decrease q2 as well; holding v1
L constant in (23), q2 is decreasing in q1.
On the other hand, holding q1 xed, v1
L is increasing in , which tends to make sellers more
likely to reject an oer of p` at t = 0. This implies a smaller increase in the fraction of high
quality assets, and hence a larger value of q2. This second eect is not present in a 1{step
equilibrium since v0
L is constant in , which explains why q1 is unambiguously decreasing
in . However, when the market is two or more periods away from market{clearing, the
second eect is active, and can even dominate the rst eect. In other words, subsidizing
the purchase of assets can increase the time required for market clearing, thus making the
market less liquid. These considerations extend to k{step equilibria, with k  3.
Using the numerical example from the previous section, Table 1 below summarizes the
eect of a transfer  that is equal to 25% of the loss from purchasing a lemon at price ph,
relative to the benchmark of  = 0.
Policy q3 q4 q2 q3 q1 q2 q0 q1
 = 0 0 :036 :206 :344 :379 :410 :422 .455
 = :25(ph   uL) 0 :049 :231 :301 :340 :369 :382 .412
Table 1: Policy Analysis
One can see immediately that this policy allows markets to clear faster if the initial fraction
of high quality assets is large, but it has little eect on (and can even increase) the time to
market clearing if this fraction is small. Consider, for example, an economy with q0 = :4:
under this policy there exists an equilibrium that clears at t = 0, whereas it takes until at
least t = 1 for the market to clear in the absence of this policy. However, the opposite is true
for, say, q0 = :22: the policy increases the minimum number of periods before the market
clears from two to three. Thus, even without considering the cost of this type of intervention,
we see that its ecacy depends crucially on the underlying severity of the lemons problem.
More generally, this exercise highlights that the timing of any intervention is crucial in an
environment with forward{looking agents; a policy that increases future payos relative to
current payos will give agents the incentive to delay trade in early periods.29
29Note that there would be a second eect if we introduced speculators that were more patient than sellers;
347 Assumptions and Market Eciency
We make several assumptions in our model that allow for a complete analytical characteri-
zation of the equilibrium set. In this section, we discuss two important restrictions, and how
our results might change if they were relaxed. The rst is the assumption that a buyer is
restricted to oer one of two exogenously specied prices, and the second is the assumption
that all agents exit the market after trading. We close the section with a discussion of market
eciency as the time interval between trading opportunities converges to zero.
Prices
We begin with the assumption of two xed prices. Though this restriction certainly has
implications for the dynamics of trade, we argue here that it captures the key trade{o
that buyers face when deciding on an oer. We also discuss the features of our equilibrium
characterization that are preserved when this restriction is relaxed.
Suppose buyers are free to choose any price p when matched with a seller. Also, consider
a variant of our model in which assets yield no ow dividends to a seller, but instead a type
j seller pays a cost cj for producing his asset, where 0 = cL < uL < cH < uH. This change
makes little dierence in our benchmark model, but it makes the analysis less cumbersome
when we place no restrictions on prices. In particular, since agents discount the future, it is
easy to show that all sellers accept any oer p  cH, so that no buyer oers more than cH in
equilibrium. In an abuse of notation, denote the payo to a buyer from oering p = cH by

B
h (q) = q[uH   cH] + (1   q)[uL   cH]:
Now note that a buyer never oers p 2 (uL;cH) in equilibrium, as only type L sellers
accept such an oer, and the buyer would receive a negative payo. Therefore, a buyer
eectively chooses between oering p = cH and a price that solves

B
` (q;;vL;vB) = max





[uL   p] +







in this case, these agents might purchase assets early from sellers in order to take advantage of increased
prices at a later date. This is the \announcement eect" identied in Chiu and Koeppl (2009).
35where, as before, vL > 0 and vB > 0 are the continuation payos to type L sellers and
buyers, respectively. Further abusing notation, let p`(;vL;vB) denote the solution to (24);
one can easily show that this solution is independent of q. Moreover, if, for example, F is
concave, this solution is unique.30
Thus, in this environment, when a buyer contemplates an optimal price oer, he faces
the same trade-o captured in the model with two exogenous prices: either oer a high price
that is accepted by all sellers and trade immediately, or a low price that will be accepted
only by suciently impatient type L sellers. The crucial dierence here is that the low price
is sensitive to the buyer's discount factor, as well as the continuation payos of both buyers
and type L sellers. These continuation values, in turn, depend on future prices, which again
depend on future continuation payos. This makes it quite dicult to derive analytical
results.
Nevertheless, several crucial results from our benchmark model can be established in
this more general environment. First, one can show that the fraction of high quality assets
increases over time until the market clears (see footnote 19). As in the case with exogenous
prices, this implies that the market clears in nite time in every equilibrium. Second, using
the same argument as in Section 4, one can show that there exists q0 2 (0;1) such that a











where p(q;;vL;vB) = p`(;vL;vB) if B
h (q) < B
` (q;;vL;vB) and ph otherwise, one can
follow the recursive procedure in Section 4 to derive the necessary and sucient conditions
























30Note that concavity of F is not necessary for uniqueness; even without this assumption, one can show
that p`(;vL;vB) is unique almost everywhere (i.e., at all but a countable number of values of ).
36Conditions (25) to (27) are analogous to conditions (18) to (20) in our benchmark model
with two xed prices. Crucially, the xed point mapping described in (18) was shown to be
single{valued, continuous, and strictly increasing in q0, which greatly simplied the equilib-
rium characterization. Establishing these properties for the analogous mapping described in
(25) would allow for the same clean characterization of equilibria in this more general set-
ting. Unfortunately, though these properties appear to be satised in a variety of numerical
simulations, we cannot verify them analytically; since the law of motion depends explicitly
on buyers' oers, and these oers in turn depend on future payos (which depend on both
q0 and future oers), the analysis quickly becomes considerably more complex.
However, if for each k  1, we simply dene qk and qk by
q
k = inffq0 2 (0;1) : 9 a k{step equilibrium given q0g
q
k = supfq0 2 (0;1) : 9 a k{step equilibrium given q0g;
it is possible to show that: (i) qk > 0 implies that qk+1 < qk; and (ii) qk > 0 implies that
qk+1 < qk. Thus, even in the absence of a complete characterization, there is a sense in
which a reduction in q0 increases the amount of time for markets to clear.
One{Time Entry
In order to study how markets clear on their own in the simplest possible environment, we
assume there is a xed stock of buyers and sellers, and that these agents leave the market
after trading. In doing so, we abstract from several interesting issues. For example, one
might want to allow buyers to re{sell their asset, either because they discover it is of low
quality or because of some stochastic, exogenous taste shock (as in Chiu and Koeppl (2009)).
The eect of allowing re{sale depends crucially on the information structure.
Suppose, for instance, that agents observe the history of trade for a particular asset.31
Consider rst the case in which there are no taste shocks, and so buyers who purchase a
31This is possible in many markets, either because there are relatively few agents in the market (as in
some markets for very specic nancial assets), or because there exists a technology that keeps track of such
histories (such as Carfax, in the used car market).
37high quality asset have no reason to re{sell it. In this case, agents are able to infer that a
particular asset is being re{sold precisely because it is low quality, leaving no expected gains
from trade. Thus, buyers who purchase a lemon have no incentive to attempt to re{sell it
even if this is feasible. Consider now the case in which there are taste shocks, so that the
decision to re{sell an asset does not signal it as being of low quality. While the analysis in
this case would certainly be more complicated, we conjecture that allowing re{sale makes
markets less liquid than they are in the baseline model. Intuitively, since buyers may need
to re{sell a high quality asset that they purchase, they should be less willing to oer ph to
begin with (because of adverse selection in the re{sale market), thus decreasing the liquidity
of these assets.
In addition to allowing buyers to re{enter the market, one might also want to consider
what would happen if new sellers could generate assets at some cost and enter the market
over time. Again, the consequences of this extension depend heavily on assumptions about
the properties of an asset that are observable. For instance, if an asset's date of creation or
\vintage" is observable, one could imagine a constant inow of new vintages at every date,
where the trading dynamics of each vintage resembles those of the single vintage we consider
in our baseline model. Alternatively, if vintages are not observable, an entry condition
could be used to endogenously determine the composition of high and low quality assets
in the market. In fact, we think the question of asset generation is extremely important|
particularly in the context of policy analysis|and our model is ideally situated to address
this issue. This is the focus of current work.
Market Eciency
Much of the literature on sequential bargaining and trade in dynamic, decentralized markets
focuses on whether equilibrium outcomes become ecient as trading frictions vanish, i.e.,
as the time interval between two consecutive trading opportunities converges to zero. We
know that when adverse selection is present, real ineciencies can persist as trading frictions
vanish; see Janssen and Roy (2002), Deneckere and Liang (2006), and H orner and Vieille
(2009). Given the assumption of exogenous prices, our framework is not ideally suited to
38address this question, though. Indeed, since we require that (uH  ph)  uL p`, we cannot
consider the limit as  converges to one (and F() converges to zero for all  < ) unless we
either drop the assumption that uH ph > uL p` or allow ph and p` to change as  increases.
The assumption that uH   ph > uL   p` was not necessary for our analysis, though. In the
Supplementary Appendix we show that if uH   ph  uL   p`, then under mild assumptions
about the distribution of discount factors, the amount of time it takes for the market to clear
does not converge to zero as trading frictions vanish.32
8 Conclusion
This paper provides a theory of how markets suering from adverse selection can recover
over time on their own. Sellers with low quality assets exit the market relatively more
quickly than those with high quality assets, causing the average quality of assets in the
market to increase over time. Eventually, all assets are exchanged. The model delivers sharp
predictions about how long this process takes, or the extent to which the market is illiquid,
as well as the behavior of prices over time. Interestingly, we nd multiple equilibria, which
suggests that there is scope for coordination failures in dynamic, decentralized markets with
adverse selection. We argue that this model serves as a useful benchmark for understanding
how exogenous events or interventions will aect the speed with which markets recover. We
provide a specic example from the recent nancial crisis, and show how accounting for
dynamic considerations can shed light on potentially harmful, unintended eects of policies
aimed at restoring liquidity in frozen markets. Natural extensions include allowing sellers
the choice of what type of asset to generate and when to enter the market, allowing buyers
to acquire costly information about an asset's quality, and introducing aggregate uncertainty
and learning. These are left for future work.
32More generally, if we allow endogenous prices as in Subsection 7, then an argument very similar to
the one in the Appendix shows that under the same assumptions on the distribution of discount factors,
the amount of time it takes for the market to clear is bounded away from zero as the time between two
consecutive trading opportunities goes to zero.
39Appendix A: Omitted Proofs and Intermediate Results
Proof of Lemma 3
Let  be an equilibrium and assume, toward a contradiction, that T() = 1. First notice
that there exists q 2 (0;1) such that
q
[uH   ph] + (1   q
)[uL   ph] = uL   p`: (28)
Since [uH ph]  uL p`, the right side of (28) is an upper bound for the payo a buyer can
obtain if he oers p`. Hence, if the fraction of type H sellers in the market is above q, then
all buyers oer ph and the market clears. Consequently, for all t  0, qt is bounded above
by q, and so is the limit of the sequence fqtg1
t=0. Now observe that since V L
t ()  ph, we
have that F(p`=V L
t ())  F(p`=ph) for all t  1. Thus, the law of motion (8) implies that
qt 
q0
q0 + (1   q0)[1   F(p`=ph)]t:
However, the right side of the above equation converges to one, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Let 0(q0;) = B
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Since vB(q)  uH   ph and uL   p`  [uH   ph], we then have that
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[uH   uL] > 0:
Now observe that 0(0) < 0 < 0(1) and 0 is continuous. So, there exists a unique q0 2 (0;1)


















when q0 = q0, and so vB(q0) > 0. Thus, 0 is an equilibrium if, and only if, q0 2 [q0;1).
Suppose now q0 < q0 and consider a strategy prole e 0 with the necessary property that
all buyers oer ph in t = 0. One alternative for a buyer is to oer ph in every period regardless
40of his discount factor. Let e p denote this strategy. It must be that V B
t (e 0)  V B
t (e pje 0) for
all t  0 if e 0 is to be an equilibrium. Now observe that if the probability of trade in each
period is  2 (0;1), then
V
B











for all t  0, where q
t+ 1 is the fraction of type H sellers in the market in period t+  1.
It is easy to see that the sequence fq
t g1
t=0 is non{decreasing. Hence,
V
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which implies that V B
t (e pje 0)  v0
B(q0). Thus, e 0 is an equilibrium only if V B
1 (e 0)  v0
B(q0).
However, since V L


























for all q0 < q0. Therefore, there exists 0 <  such that it can not be optimal for a buyer
with discount factor in (0;] to oer ph at t = 0, so that the market clearing immediately
cannot be an equilibrium outcome. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that q+(q;v0
L) is strictly increasing in q when p`=v0
L <  and that q+(q;v0
L)  1
otherwise. From this it is immediate to see that there exists q1 < q0 such that q+(q0;v0
L)  q0
if, and only if, q0 2 [q1;1]. Note that q1 = 0 if p`=v0
L   and q1 is such that q+(q1;v0
L) = q0


































Thus, since uL   p`  [uH   ph] and












q + (1   q)[1   F (p`=ph)]
< 1;
41we can then conclude that 1 is strictly increasing in q0 regardless of the value of p`=ph. Since
1(0;) < 0 < 1(1;) and 1 is continuous in q0, there exists a unique q1 2 (0;1) such that
1(q0;) < 0 if, and only if q0 2 [0;q1). Hence, B









only if q0 2 [0;q1). Next, observe that since v0
B[q+(q0;ph)] > v0






























Thus, 1(q0;) < 0, from which we obtain that q1 > q0. 
Lemma 4 and Proof
Lemma 4. The payo v1




0   q0)[uH   uL] for
all q0
0 > q0. The fraction 1 is continuous and increasing in q0, with limq0!q1 1(q0) = 1. The
payo v1
L is continuous and increasing in q0, with limq0!q1 v1
L(q0) = v0
L.
Proof: Note that q+(q0;v0
L) continuous in q0 implies that v1
B(q0) is also continuous in q0.




0   q0)[uH   uL] for all q0

















[uL   p`   (uL   ph)] (29)





















B(q0;)dF(), we are done if we show that q0









0   q0)[uH   uL] (30)
regardless of . We know from the proof of Proposition 2 that 1 is strictly increasing in
q0. Since 1(0;) < 0 < 1(0;) for all  2 [0;], for each  2 [0;] there exists a unique
q = q() 2 (0;1) such that 1(q;)  0 if, and only if, q  q; note that q() = q1. Now
let q0














we have that (30) holds if q0
0 > q. Suppose then that q0





















[uL   p`   (uL   ph)];
42from which the desired result follows given that the second term on the right side of the
above equation is negative.









is strictly increasing in , 1 is strictly decreasing in .
Let 1(q0), with q0 2 [q1;q1) \ (0;q1), be such that: (i) 1(q0) = 0 if 1(q0;1(q0)) = 0; and
(ii) 1(q0;1(q0)) = 0 if 1(q0;0) > 0. Since 1(q1;) = 0 and 1 is strictly increasing in q,
1(q0) is uniquely dened. By construction, 1 is the cuto discount factor below which a
buyer nds it optimal to oer ph in t = 0. Hence, the probability 1(q0) that a buyer oers
ph in t = 0 is equal to F(1(q0)). Given that 1 is jointly continuous, a standard argument
shows that 1 depends continuously on q0. Moreover, the cuto 1(q0) is strictly increasing
in q0 if 1(q0;0) > 0, as 1 is strictly increasing in q. The desired result follows from the fact
that F is continuous and strictly increasing and limq0!q1 1(q1) =  (as 1(q1;) = 0).
To nish the proof, note that the continuity of 1(q0) and the fact that limq0!q1 1(q0) = 1
imply that v1
L(q0) is continuous in q0, with limq0!q1 v0
L(q0) = ph = v0
L. 
Proof of Proposition 3
We rst show that (15) and (16) imply (17), so that the rst two conditions completely






































for all  2 [0;]. Condition (31) implies that, no matter his discount factor, the incentive of
a buyer to choose p` in t = 0 is even greater than his incentive to choose p` in t = 1, when
































































uL   p`   (uL   ph)

;

























































L(q0) for all q0 2

q1;q1
\ (0;1), uL < ph, and q0 > q0, the second term on the
right side of the above inequality is negative, which conrms (31).
We now show that there exists a 2{step equilibrium if, and only if, q0 2 [q2;q2) \ (0;1).






q0 + (1   q0)[1   F(p`=v1
L(q0))]
is greater than q0, i.e., only if p`=v1
L(q0) < . Now observe that if p`=v1




q0 [1   F (p`=v1
L(q0))]
1   q0F (p`=v1
L(q0))
belongs to the interval (0;1) and is such that q+(q (q0);v1
L(q0)) = q0. Thus, (15) is satised
for q0 2 [q1;q1) \ (0;1) if, and only if, p`=v1
L(q0) < . Moreover, it is immediate to see that
q (q0) is the only possible value of q0 for which (15) and (16) can hold.
Since v1
L(q0) is increasing in q0, p`=v1
L(e q) <  implies that p`=v1
L(q0) <  for all q0 > e q.
Then let e q1 be such that e q1 = 0 if p`=v1
L(q1) <  and e q1 = supfq0 2 [q1;q1) : p`=v1
L(q0) = g
if p`=v1
L(q1)  ; note that e q1 is well{dened since p`=v1
L(q1) = p`=v0
L < . By construction,
there exists q0 2 (0;1) such that (15) and (16) are satised if, and only if, q0 2 [q1;q1)\(e q1;1),
in which case q0 = q (q0). Given that F and v1
L are continuous, it is easy to see that q  is
continuous. Moreover, since v1
L is increasing in q0, the map q  is also strictly increasing in q0.
Thus, q  is invertible and its inverse Q2
+ : [q1;q1)\(e q1;1) ! (0;1) is continuous and strictly
increasing. By construction, we have that: (i) when p`=v1
L(q1) < , a 2{step equilibrium
exists if, and only if, Q2
+(q0) 2 [q1;q1)\(0;1); (ii) when p`=v1
L(q1)  , a 2{step equilibrium
exists if, and only if, Q2
+(q0) 2 (e q1;q1). We are done if we show that limq0!e q1 q (q0) = 0
when p`=v1
L(e q)  . This follows from the fact that limq0!e q1 F(p`=v1
L(q0)) = 1. 
44Lemma 5 and Proof
Lemma 5. The payo v2




0   q0)[uH   uL] for
all q0
0 > q0. The fraction 2 is continuous and increasing in q0, with limq0!q2 2(q0) = 1(q2).
The payo v2
L is continuous and increasing in q0, with v2






+(q0)) for all q0.
Proof: We start by showing that 2(q0;) = B










strictly increasing in q0; this is important for what follows. Let q0
























































































































0   q0)(uH   uL); (32)
the rst inequality follows from Lemma 4 and the fact that Q2
+(q0) is increasing in q0. Hence,
2(q0
0;)   2(q0;)  (1   )(q0
0   q0)(uH   uL) > 0, which proves the desired result.
We rst establish the properties of v1
B. Since Q2
+ is continuous in q0, the continuity of v2
B
follows from the continuity of v1
B and v1
L. We now prove that if q0
























As in the proof of Lemma 4, we know that for each  2 [0;], there exists a unique q =
q() 2 (0;1) such that 2(q0;)  0 if, and only if, q0  q; by construction, q() = q2.
Then let q0







0   q0)[uH   uL]
if q0
0 > q. Suppose then that q0
0  q. In this case, the above inequality follows from (32),





45Now, we establish the properties of 2. Since 2 is strictly increasing in q0 and strictly
decreasing in , an argument similar to the one used in the proof of Proposition 2 shows that
for each q0 2 [q2;q2) \ (0;1), there is a unique 2 = 2(q0) 2 [0;), which is continuous and
increasing in q0, such that 2(q0;)  0 if, and only if   2(q0). Thus, 2(q0) = F(2(q0))

































For the properties of v2
L, rst notice that Q2
+ and v1
L continuous in q0 imply that v2
L is


































Moreover, by (31), we have that 2(q0)  1(Q2




+(q0)) for all q0. 
Proof of Theorem 1






(A1) q0 = 1 and qs  qs 1 < qs < qs 1 for all s 2 f1;:::;k   1g;
(A2) for each s 2 f0;:::;k   1g, a s{step equilibrium exists if, and only if, q0 2 [qs;qs 1) \
(0;1).
Moreover, suppose that for each s 2 f0;:::;k   1g, there exist functions vs
B(q0) and vs
L(q0),
and a map Qs
+(q0), such that:
(A3) Qs
+(q0) is the value of q1 in any s{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of type H
sellers is q0;












































for all q0 2 [qs;qs) and  2 [0;];
(A6) vs




0 q0)[uH  uL] for all q0
0 > q0;
(A7) vs
L is continuous and increasing in q0, with vs








+(q0) for all q0.
Finally, suppose that:
(A8) for each s 2 f1;:::;k   1g, qs = 0 if, and only if, p`=v
s 1
L (qs 1)  .
Note that the payos vs
B(q0) and vs



































Ifs(q0;) > 0gdF() is the mass of buyers who oer ph in the rst period
of trade in a s{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0.
Conditions (A1) to (A8) are true when k = 3 by Propositions 1 to 3 and Lemmas 4 and 5
(equation (33) reduces to (31) when s = 2). In what follows we show that p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) < 
implies that there exist cutos qk and qk, payo functions vk
B(q0) and vk
L(q0), and a map
Qk
+(q0) such that (A1) to (A8) are also satised when s = k.
We know from the main text that conditions (18) to (20) are necessary and sucient
for a k{step equilibrium to exist. We rst show that (18) and (19) imply (20), so that the
47rst two conditions are necessary and sucient for a k{step equilibrium to exist. For this,
suppose that q0 = q+(q0;v
k 1

































[uL   p`] + 










































[uL   p`   (uL   ph)]
+ 






















































































































































































B (q00)   B
h (q00)
	
. Given that v
k 1
L (q0) < v
k 2
L (q00)
by (A6), q0  q0, and  > 0 (as v
k 1
































48Consequently, k 1(q0;)  k(q0;) for all  2 [0;]. In particular, since k 1(q0;)  0 for
all q0 2 [qk 1;qk 1)\(0;1), we have that k(q0;)  0 as well, so that (20) is indeed satised.
Suppose now that p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) <  and dene the cutos qk and qk to be such that: (i)
q+(qk;v
k 1
L (qk 1)) = qk 1 if p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) <  and qk = 0 otherwise; (ii) q+(qk;v
k 1
L (qk 1)) =
qk 1. It is immediate to see 0 < qk < qk 1. Since qk 1 = 0 if, and only if, p`=v
k 2
L (qk 2)  
(by (A8)) and v
k 1
L (qk 1)  v
k 2
L (qk 2) (by (A6)), we have that qk  qk 1. Now note that if
qk 1 = 0, then (trivially) qk > qk 1. Suppose then that qk 1 > 0. Given that qk 1 > qk 2,
we have that v
k 1
L (qk 1) = v
k 2





















from which we obtain that qk > qk 1; recall that q+(q;vL) is strictly increasing in q when
p`=vL < . Finally, the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 3|just replace the
superscripts \1" and \2" with \k   1" and \k," respectively|shows that: (i) there exists a
k{step equilibrium if, and only if, q0 2 [qk;qk)\(0;1); (ii) for each q0 2 [qk;qk)\(0;1), there
exists a unique q0 = Qk
+(q0) 2 [qk 1;qk 1)\(0;1) such that q0 is the value of q1 in any k{step
equilibrium when the initial fraction of type H sellers is q0; (iii) the map Qk
+ is continuous
and strictly increasing. Thus, (A1), (A2), (A3), (A5), and (A8) are valid for s = k.
To nish the induction step, let vk
B and vk
L be given by (21) and (22), respectively, where
k(q0) =
R
Ifk(q0;)  0gdF(). By construction, for each q0 2 [qk;qk) \ (0;1), vk
B(q0) and
vk
L(q0) are, respectively, the payos to buyers and type L sellers in a k{step equilibrium (so
that (A4) holds when s = k), and k(q0) is the fraction of buyers who oer ph in the rst
period of trade in a k{step equilibrium. The same argument used in the proof of Lemma 5
shows that k(q0) is increasing in q0 and that (A6) and (A7) hold when s = k; once more
just replace the superscripts \1" and \2" with \k   1" and \k," respectively.
The induction process described above continues until k is such that p`=vk
L(qk)  ,
if such a k exists. We conclude the proof by showing that such a k indeed exists, so that
K = maxfk : p`=v
k 1
L (qk 1) < g. Suppose not. In this case, there exists a strictly decreasing
sequence fqkg1
k=0 such that if q0 < qk, then there exists a s{step equilibrium with s  k when
the initial fraction of type H sellers in the market is q0. Since the market clears in a nite
49number of periods in any equilibrium, it must then be that limk!1 qk = 0. In particular,
there exists k0 2 N such that B
h (qk) < 0 for all k  k0. This implies that k 1(qk) = 0 for all
k  k0; not even a myopic buyer nds it optimal to oer ph when the expected payo from
doing so is negative. Therefore, limk!1 vk
L(qk) = limk!1 v
k 1
L (qk) = p`, a contradiction. 
Lemmas 6 and 7 and Proofs
Lemma 6. Ek
H(q0) is decreasing in q0 for all k 2 f0;:::;Kg.
Proof: For each q0 2 [qk;qk) \ (0;1), let k









q0(s) is the probability that a type H seller trades his asset on or before
period s 2 f0;:::;kg in a k{step equilibrium when the initial fraction of high quality assets
is q0. A straightforward induction argument shows that










t=1 is the sequence such that qt = Q
k t+1
+ (qt 1). We know from the main text









rst{order stochastic sense; the desired result follows from this. 
Lemma 7. E(q0) is decreasing in q0.
Proof: Let q0;q0
0 2 (0;1) be such that q0 < q0
0. By construction, there exist k1;k2 2
f0;:::;Kg such that E(q0) = E
k1





(i) Suppose that k2  k1. In this case, there exists a k1{step at q0
0. Indeed, if q0
0  qk1, then
q0
0  qk2, which implies that no k2{step equilibrium exists at q0
0, a contradiction. Moreover,
if q0
0 < qk1, then q0 < qk1, in which case no k1{step equilibrium exists at q0, a contradiction






H (q0) = E(q0);
(ii) Suppose now that k2 < k1 and let k0 be the greatest value of k such that a k{step
equilibrium exists at q0







H (q0) = E(q0). Suppose then that k0 < k1. We know from the
proof of Theorem 1 that limq0!qk k(q0) = k 1(qk) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg, from which it is
easy to see that limq0!qk Ek
H(q0) = E
k 1
H (qk) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Hence, using Lemma 6





H (q0)  E
k1 1
H (q










which establishes the desired result. 
Appendix B: Supplemental Material (Online Appendix)
Section 2: Constructing Payos
Here we show how to derive payos using our renement. We make use of the following
result, the proof of which we omit; uniform continuity is crucial for the limit to exist.
Lemma 8. If f : (0;1) ! R is bounded and uniformly continuous, then limx!1 f(x) exists.
Fix a strategy prole  and let a = fa
j
tg be a strategy for a type j seller. For each n  0




t=0 of payos recursively as follows. Let
V
j
n+1;n(aj;) = cj and for each t  n, let
V
j

























where t(pj) is the fraction of buyers who oer p in period t; t(pj) is the probability that
a buyer who can trade in period t draws a discount factor  with pt() = p. By construction,
given , V
j
t;n(aj;) is the expected lifetime payo to a type j seller who is in the market
in period t  n + 1 following strategy a when the market stops operating in period n. The
payo V
j
t (aj;) is the limit limn!1 V
j
t;n(aj;); it is easy to see that fV
j
t;n(aj;)g is an
increasing, and thus convergent, sequence.
Now let b  be the strategy prole that diers from  only in that buyers oer ph in every
period t no matter their discount factor. It is immediate to see that V
j
t (aj;)  V
j
t (ajb ;)
51for all t  0 and  2 (0;1). Moreover, since ph  yH + ph by (4), if the behavior of buyers
is given by b , then the optimal decision for a seller is to accept ph immediately. Therefore,
V
j
t (ajb ;)  ph, and thus V
j
t (aj;)  ph, for all t  0 and  2 (0;1).
To nish, for each t  n, let t
n(tj;a;) be the probability that a type j seller in the
market in period t following strategy a stays in the market until period n+1 when the other
agents behave according to . Since V
j
















Hence, for each t  0, V
j
t;n(aj;) converges to V
j
t (aj;) uniformly in . It is straightfor-
ward to see that if V
j
t+1;n(aj;) is uniformly continuous in  for  2 (0;1), then V
j
t+1;n(aj;)
also is. Given that V
j
n+1;n(aj;) is (trivially) uniformly continuous in , we can then con-
clude (since uniform continuity is preserved by uniform convergence) that for all t  0,
V
j
t (aj;) is uniformly continuous in  for  2 (0;1). Consequently, since V
j
t (aj;) is
bounded above by ph, the limit lim!1 V
j
t (aj;) is well{dened for all t  0.
For any strategy p for a buyer, the payos V B
t (pj;), with t  0 and  2 (0;1), can
be computed in a similar way and the same argument as above shows that V B
t (pj;) is
bounded (by uH ph) and uniformly continuous in , in which case lim!1 V B
t (pj;) exists.
Section 4: Time to Market Clearing
Let q be such that B
h (q) = 0. Clearly q0 > q regardless of F, as the payo from oering
p` is positive, and so no buyer oers ph when q  q. Suppose then that q0 < q and let
N  1 be the value of k such that

N





k=0 to be the sequence such that v0






for all k 2 f1;:::;Ng. By construction, the payo to sellers in a k{step equilibrium is
bounded below by vk
L. Since vk
L is decreasing in k, the fraction of high quality assets in the
market after N periods of trade is bounded above by
qmax;N =
q0
q0 + (1   q0)[1   F(p`=v
N 1
L )]N :











(1   q0)q: (35)





ph, we have that F(p`=v
N 1
L ) converges to zero as F(p`=
N 1
ph) converges to
zero, in which case the left side of (35) converges to one. Therefore, if the distribution F puts
sucient mass on discount factors close enough to , the market takes at least N periods
to clear when q0 < q. It is easy to see that there are values of the model's parameters for
which N can be very large.
Section 7: Market Eciency as Time Between Trades Vanishes
In order to study market eciency as trading frictions vanish, it is convenient to embed our
framework in a continuous time environment. Suppose now that time runs continuously and
the market opens for trade every  > 0 units of time, i.e., the market opens in t = 0;;2,
and so on. The agents' discount rate r in each time interval between two consecutive trading
opportunities is a draw from a c.d.f. G with support [r;+1), where r > 0 and the draws
are independent across agents and over time. Thus, the c.d.f. F describing the distribution
of the agents' discount factors in each period has support [0;], where  = () = e r < 1,
and is such that F() = 1   G( ln=). Note that lim!0  = 1 and that for all  < 1,
lim!0 F() = 0. Thus, the agents become innitely patient in the limit as the time interval
between two consecutive trading periods goes to zero.
Let q0 < q and dene T to be the number of trading periods it takes for the market to
clear; recall that q is the unique value of q such that B
h (q) = 0. Note that an option for
a type L seller is to reject any oer he receives until the period in which the market clears.
Thus, a lower bound for his payo is vL = E[e rT]ph. Now assume that  = vL=p` > 1








(1   q0)q = (q0);
here we implicitly assume that ln > r, which is satised if  is small enough. Since an
53upper bound for the fraction of high quality assets in the market after N periods of trade is
q(N) =
q0
q0 + (1   q0)[1   F(p`=vL)]N =
q0
q0 + (1   q0)[G(ln=)]N ;
and no buyer oers ph if the fraction of type H sellers in the market is smaller than q, a
necessary condition for the market to clear after T periods of trade is that
q(T)  q






Since G(ln=) 2 (0;1), we can then conclude that T  N. Therefore,



















when   0. Suppose then, by contradiction, that lim!0 T = 0. Since  > 1 implies that
 ln((q0))ln > 0, we can then conclude from (36) that lim!0 T > 0, a contradiction.
The assumption that g(r) = O(1=rk) with k  2 when r ! 1 is fairly mild. In fact, a
necessary condition for
R 1
r g(r)dr to be nite is that g(r) converges to zero faster than 1=r
as r ! 1, i.e., the density g is such that g(r) = O(1=rk) with k > 1 as r ! 1.
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